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I. Introduction

On the morning of December 14, 2012, L 1 began his assault on
the Sandy Hook Elementary School. 2 Wearing black fatigues and
a military vest, L armed himself with a Bushmaster XM15-E2S,
Remington’s version of the AR-15 assault rifle. 3 Using that
weapon, L entered the school by shooting a hole through a locked
entrance, and then killed twenty children and six adults before
killing himself. 4 In response to this shooting and the loss of their
loved ones, the families of the Sandy Hook Elementary School
victims sought judicial relief from a gun manufacturer and two
other defendants in the chain of distribution.
When the plaintiffs’ claims failed to survive a motion to strike
in the Connecticut Superior Court, they appealed to the
Connecticut Supreme Court. On March 15, 2019, a 4-3 decision of
the Connecticut Supreme Court fired its own shot across the bow
of the often impenetrable shield of the Protection of Lawful
Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA). 5 With certain limited exceptions,
the PLCAA shields gun manufacturers, dealers, and sellers of
firearms and ammunition from any civil actions when a third party
commits a crime or misuses the product. 6 In Soto v. Bushmaster
Firearms International, LLC, 7 the Connecticut Supreme Court
ruled that the PLCAA did not bar a lawsuit filed under the
Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). 8 The majority’s
opinion, in the face of a strong dissent, seemingly misunderstood
the clear legislative intent of the statute. The decision also opened
the courtroom door for families of the victims of the tragic Sandy
Hook Elementary School shooting and may spawn litigation using
a similar theory in other jurisdictions. This essay explores the
1. The authors have intentionally omitted the shooter’s name.
2. Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int’l, LLC, 202 A.3d 262, 276 (Conn. 2019).
3. Id. at 275.
4. Id. at 276.
5. Id. at 273; see also Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 7901–7903 (2012).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903.
7. 202 A.3d 262 (Conn. 2019).
8. Id. at 325; see also Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, CONN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 42-110a–42-110q (2019).
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PLCAA and concludes that the court’s activism supplants its own
policy preferences for bipartisan legislation.
II. The PLCAA Provides Broad Protection for Manufacturers,
Distributors, and Retailers
In 2005, Congress enacted the PLCAA in response to an
increase in the number of lawsuits brought against the firearms
industry for harm caused by the criminal use of firearms. 9 Prior to
the passage of the PLCAA, the gun industry found itself repeatedly
defending against negligence and product liability claims. 10 While
the firearms industry often prevailed in such litigation, the
firearms industry faced new obstacles with the passage of state
and local laws clarifying liability. 11 For example, some laws limited
the liability of the industry and others held the industry liable,
regardless of any defect in the product. 12 Congress enacted the
PLCAA, in part, due to its concern about “the possibility of
imposing liability on an entire industry for harm that is solely
caused by others” which it viewed as “an abuse of the legal system”
that would undermine both a constitutional right and civil
liberty. 13
A. The General Rule
One of the stated purposes of the PLCAA is “[t]o prohibit
causes of action against manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and
importers of firearms or ammunition products, and their trade
associations, for the harm solely caused by the criminal or
unlawful misuse of firearm products or ammunition products by
9. Ross Sorenson, The Ninth Circuit Forecloses a Bullet Sized Hole in the
PLCAA in Ileto v. Glock, 565 F.3d 1126 (9th. Cir. 2009), 35 S. ILL. U. L.J. 573, 573
(2011).
10. Id. at 574.
11. Id. at 575.
12. See id. (“Virginia limited the liability of the firearms industry, while the
District of Columbia’s statute essentially held gun manufacturers absolutely
liable, regardless of product defect.”).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(6).
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others when the product functioned as designed and intended.” 14
The protections of this statute are not absolute. Although the
statute prohibits commencing a “qualified civil liability action” in
a state or federal court, 15 the PLCAA has six exceptions to this
blanket prohibition. 16 The authors have limited their discussion to
the exception principally relied upon by the plaintiffs in this case,
the predicate exception.
B. The Predicate Exception
The predicate exception applies to “an action in which a
manufacturer or seller of a qualified product knowingly violated a
State or Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of the
product, and the violation was a proximate cause of the harm for
which relief is sought . . . .” 17 The proper scope and interpretation
of the predicate exception has been the subject of judicial scrutiny
with courts often focused on how the word “applicable” should be
14. Id. § 7901(b)(1).
15. Id. § 7902(a).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5) details six exceptions to this rule. These exceptions
include:
(i) an action brought against a transferor convicted under section 924(h) of
Title 18, United States Code, or a comparable or identical State felony law,
by a party directly harmed by the conduct of which the transferee is so
convicted; (ii) an action brought against a seller for negligent entrustment
or negligence per se; (iii) an action in which a manufacturer or seller of a
qualified product knowingly violated a State or Federal statute applicable
to the sale or marketing of the product, and the violation was a proximate
cause of the harm for which relief is sought . . . ; (iv) an action for breach
of contract or warranty in connection with the purchase of the product; (v)
an action for death, physical injuries or property damage resulting directly
from a defect in design or manufacture of the product, when used as
intended or in a reasonably foreseeable manner, except that where the
discharge of the product was caused by a volitional act that constituted a
criminal offense, then such act shall be considered the sole proximate
cause of any resulting death, personal injuries or property damage; or (vi)
an action or proceeding commenced by the Attorney General to enforce the
provisions of chapter 44 of Title 18 . . . or chapter 53 of Title 26, United
States Code . . . .
Id. § 7903(5).
17. Id. § 7903(5)(A)(iii).
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understood. 18 Does this requirement mean the particular statute
violated must specifically apply to the sale or marketing of
firearms, or does it mean that the statute has to simply be capable
of being applied to the sale or marketing of firearms?
III. The Connecticut Supreme Court Paves the Way for Gun
Manufacturer Liability
Before addressing the court’s interpretation of the predicate
exception, this Part addresses the plaintiffs’ causes of action in
Soto. Plaintiffs sued three defendants: the manufacturer, the
distributor, and the retailer of the military assault style weapon
used by the perpetrator in the Sandy Hook tragedy. 19 The plaintiffs
argued that defendants were liable based on two alternative
claims: (1) the negligent entrustment of a military style weapon to
civilians and (2) a CUTPA violation due to the advertising and
marketing practices associated with this weapon. 20 After deciding
whether these claims could withstand the defendants’ motion to
strike, the court then had to determine whether the PLCAA barred
such claims.
A. Causes of Action
Negligent entrustment, which has its origins in English
common law, 21 holds those in possession of a dangerous instrument
(such as a car or a gun) responsible for ensuring that such items
are only entrusted to those fit to exercise possession. 22 Connecticut
courts that have applied the doctrine of negligent entrustment
18. Kyle Armstrong, Nigh-Impenetrable: Firearm Manufacturer Liability
Under the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act in a Post-Heller World, 28
GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 173, 185 (2018).
19. Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int’l, LLC, 202 A.3d 262, 273 (Conn. 2019).
20. Id. at 274.
21. In Dixon v. Bell, 105 Eng. Rep. 1023 (K.B. 1816), the court found a
defendant liable for harm caused by the accidental discharge of a firearm. In that
case, defendant had asked a young girl to retrieve a loaded weapon for him,
despite his knowledge that this young girl was unfit for this responsibility. See
Soto, 202 A.3d at 280 (citing Dixon v. Bell, 105 Eng. Rep. 1023 (K.B. 1816)).
22. Soto, 202 A.3d at 279.
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have generally required that “a person can be held liable for
third-party injuries resulting from another’s use of a dangerous
item only if the entrustment of that item was made with actual or
constructive knowledge that misuse by the entrustee was
foreseeable.” 23 The plaintiffs in Soto did not allege that the
defendants should have foreseen unsafe use of the particular
purchased weapon. 24 Instead, the plaintiffs proposed that the
defendants were negligent simply by virtue of selling a military
assault style weapon in the civilian marketplace “because the
defendants could each foresee the firearm ending up in the hands
of members of an incompetent class in a dangerous
environment.” 25 The Connecticut Supreme Court was unwilling to
adopt the plaintiffs’ expansion of the negligent entrustment
doctrine. 26
Having resolved the negligent entrustment claim, the Court
then turned its attention to the plaintiffs’ claim for relief under the
provisions of CUTPA. This statute, enacted in 1973 and modeled
after the Federal Trade Commission Act, provides that “[n]o person
shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or
commerce.” 27 The Act, general in nature, applies in a variety of
circumstances. 28 To define an unfair or deceptive act, the courts in
Connecticut generally rely on the “cigarette rule” of the Federal
Trade Commission Act. 29 Under this rule, the court considers the
following tests in a determination of unfairness or deception:
23. Id. at 280.
24. Id. at 282–83.
25. Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int’l, LLC, No. FBTCV156048103S, 2016
WL 8115354, at *10 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 14, 2016).
26. Soto, 202 A.3d at 282.
27. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110b(a) (2019).
28. About the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practice Act, CONN. ST. DEP’T OF
CONSUMER
PROTECTION,
https://portal.ct.gov/DCP/Trade-Practices-Division/About-the-Connecticut-Unfai
r-Trade-Practices-Act-CUTPA (last visited Sept. 2, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
29. See Ulbrich v. Groth, 78 A.3d 76, 100 (Conn. 2013) (explaining that the
cigarette rule as a test for unfairness against consumers was adopted by the FTC
in 1964); see also J. Howard Beales, The FTC’s Use of Unfairness Authority: Its
Rise, Fall, and Resurrection, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (May 30, 2003),
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2003/05/ftcs-use-unfairness-authority-its-
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1. [w]hether the practice, without necessarily having been
previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has
been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise—in
other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common
law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; 2.
whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous;
3. whether it causes substantial injury to consumers,
[competitors or other business persons.] 30

Unfairness may result from breach of one of the above tests or
some combination of a violation of all three tests. 31 In Soto, the
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants marketed the AR-15 in an
“unethical, oppressive, immoral and unscrupulous manner.” 32
That marketing, according to the plaintiffs, included
advertisements and catalogs promoting use of the AR-15 for
offensive, military style missions. 33 In their motion to strike the
plaintiffs’ CUTPA claim, the defendants argued that “CUTPA does
not provide protection for persons who do not have a consumer or
commercial relationship with the alleged wrongdoer.” 34 The
Connecticut Supreme Court rejected this argument and opted
instead to broaden the reach of CUTPA by concluding that
“[b]ecause the principal evils associated with unscrupulous and
illegal advertising are not ones that necessarily arise from or infect
the relationship between an advertiser and its customers,
competitors, or business associates, we hold that a party directly
injured by conduct resulting from such advertising can bring an
action pursuant to CUTPA even in the absence of a business
relationship . . . .” 35 The court likewise rejected the defendants’
rise-fall-and-resurrection (last visited Sept. 2, 2019) (outlining “the important role
the FTC's unfairness authority can and should play in fashioning consumer
protection policy”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Although
the FTC moved away from use of this rule in 1980, the Connecticut courts
continue to apply these alternative tests. See Robert M. Langer & Benjamin M.
Daniels, Is It Time to Extinguish CUTPA’s “Cigarette Rule,” CONN. LAW., Apr.
2016, at 14.
30. Ulbrich, 78 A.3d at 100.
31. Id.
32. Soto, 202 A.3d at 277.
33. Id. at 277–78.
34. Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int’l, LLC, 2016 WL 8115354 at *17 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Oct. 14, 2016).
35. Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int’l, LLC, 202 A.3d 262, 285 (Conn. 2019).
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argument that damages for personal injury were not available
under CUTPA, holding instead that “at least with respect to
wrongful advertising claims, personal injuries alleged to have
resulted directly from such advertisements are cognizable under
CUTPA.” 36
B. The Connecticut Supreme Court Interprets the Predicate
Exception
Having determined that the plaintiffs “pleaded legally
cognizable CUTPA claims sounding in wrongful marketing,” the
Connecticut Supreme Court considered whether the PLCAA bars
the plaintiffs’ claim. 37 Plaintiffs could only maintain their claims if
CUTPA fell within the PLCAA’s predicate exception. Stated
differently, the court needed to determine whether “applicable to
the sale or marketing of the product,” 38 limits the predicate
exception to statutes regulating the sale or marketing of firearms
specifically or whether a statute of general applicability, such as
CUTPA, qualifies for the exception.
The court first set forth the principles it intended to apply in
the construction of the PLCAA and its predicate exception. 39 Those
principles demand that the court first look to the plain meaning of
the statute. 40 Legislative history and other tools of statutory
construction only become relevant when “the text of a statute is
ambiguous.” 41 According to the Connecticut Supreme Court, upon
a finding of ambiguity in the statute, the court must next look to
canons of statutory construction and, failing that, it must review
the statute’s legislative history. 42 In essence, the court intended to
follow a specific roadmap in its statutory interpretation. Despite
36. Id. at 300.
37. Id.
38. Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii)
(2012).
39. Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int’l, LLC, 202 A.3d 262, 301 (Conn. 2019).
40. Id. (citing CCT Commc’ns, Inc. v. Zone Telecom, Inc., 172 A.3d 1228
(Conn. 2017)).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 312.
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this roadmap, the court veered from its purported route several
times on the way to its destination.
1. Plain Meaning of the Statute
A common starting point in statutory interpretation by both
state and federal judges is that, “the plain meaning of the statute
controls,” with an exception for those instances in which that
outcome would either yield an absurd result or be at odds with
congressional intent. 43 In fact, “the Roberts Court has embraced a
plain language approach to statutory interpretation.” 44 It is not
surprising then, that faced with the task of interpreting the
undefined term of a federal law, in this case the meaning of
“applicable,” the Connecticut Supreme Court began with an eye
toward the ordinary, dictionary meaning of the statutory
language. 45 The dictionary definitions persuaded the court that
‘‘applicable’’ meant simply ‘‘[c]apable of being applied . . . .’’ 46 This
reading supported the plaintiffs’ view that a statute need not deal
specifically with firearms to be within the predicate exception.
Despite adopting this broad reading of “applicable,” the court noted
that there were secondary dictionary definitions of ‘‘applicable’’
that might support the defendants’ narrower reading of the
predicate exception. 47 Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary, for example, defines ‘‘applicable’’ as ‘‘fit, suitable, or
right to be applied: appropriate . . . relevant . . . .’’ 48 The court
acknowledged the reasonableness of both interpretations and then
looked to the statutory framework of the PLCAA’s predicate

43. Steven Witsotsky, How to Interpret Statutes—Or Not: Plain Meaning
and Other Phantoms, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 321, 325 (2009).
44. David A. Strauss, The Plain Language Court, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 651,
651 (2016).
45. Soto, 202 A.3d at 302 (citing Maslenjak v. United States, 37 S. Ct. 1918,
1924 (2017)).
46. Id. (citing Applicable, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)); accord
Applicable, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002).
47. Id. (citing Applicable, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
(2002)).
48. Applicable, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002).
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exception to add color to its plain meaning review. 49 Although the
court began with an orderly approach to statutory interpretation,
the court then seemed to combine the principles in a manner that
moves away from a logical review of the PLCAA and its predicate
exception. After finding the reasonableness of both statutory
interpretations, the court’s own stated roadmap indicated that the
court should have moved to the canons of construction and then, if
necessary, the legislative history. Instead, the court used
legislative history to draw conclusions with respect to the plain
meaning of the statute. The court stated, “[i]f Congress intended
the predicate exception to encompass laws that prohibit the
wrongful marketing of firearms, and if no laws expressly and
directly do so, then the only logical reading of the statute is that
Congress had some other type of law in mind.” 50 The authors
cannot determine if the muddied approach here constitutes a
failure of organization, a lack of discipline, or merely the ordinary
difficulties inherent in statutory interpretation.
2. Canons of Construction
After finding two reasonable interpretations of the predicate
exception, the court moved on to address the canons of
construction. The phrase “canons of construction” encompasses a
set of background norms and conventions used by courts when
interpreting statutes. 51 The U.S. Supreme Court recently referred
to them as “simply rules of thumb which will sometimes help
courts determine the meaning of legislation.” 52 The U.S. Supreme
Court has also acknowledged that “judges regularly exercise broad
discretion in deciding when the canons should apply . . . and how
to reconcile them with other contextual resources . . . .” 53 In Soto,
the court reviewed several canons of construction. This part
focuses on three particular canons addressed: narrow
49. Soto, 202 A.3d at 302.
50. Id. at 304 (emphasis added).
51. James Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the
Elusive Question for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005).
52. Id. (citing Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 511 (1996)).
53. Id.
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interpretation of exceptions, ejusdem generis, and noscitur a sociis,
and interpreting statutes in a manner that avoids absurd results.
The defendants contended that the court must narrowly
construe the predicate exception, like other statutory exceptions,
in a manner that preserves the primary purpose of the PLCAA. 54
The court dismissed this argument finding that Congress did not
enact the PLCAA in an effort to shield the firearms industry from
liability for wrongful or illegal conduct. 55 In other words, the court
dismissed the canon based solely on the legislative history of the
PLCAA, and, for reasons which the court did not explain, ignored
the canon of construction requiring a narrow reading of an
exception.
The defendants also asserted the relevance of two related
canons of construction: noscitur a sociis (the meaning of doubtful
terms or phrases may be determined by reference to their
relationship with other associated words or phrases) and ejusdem
generis (when general words are accompanied by a specific
enumeration of persons or things, the general words should be
limited to persons or things similar to those specifically
enumerated). 56 Through the application of noscitur a sociis and
ejusdem generis the defendants argued that “broader terms, when
used together with more narrow terms, may have a more restricted
meaning than if they stand alone.” 57 The defendants argued that
the “specific examples of firearms laws that Congress provides in
the predicate exception strongly suggest that it intended only those
statutes that are specific to the firearms trade to be considered
‘applicable to the sale or marketing of the product . . . .’” 58 The
court, finding the defendants’ argument unpersuasive, held that
the related doctrines do not apply when the legislative history
demands a broader reading. 59 The court believed that Congress
included these examples as a mere accommodation to certain
54. Soto, 202 A.3d at 317 (citing Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Clark, 489
U.S. 726, 739 (1989)).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 330 (Robinson, C.J., dissenting) (defining noscitur a sociis); see also
id. at 313 (majority opinion) (defining ejusdem generis).
57. Id. at 337 (Robinson, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
58. Id.
59. See id.
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legislative dissenters and did not intend to narrow the reach of the
predicate exception. 60
The court also addressed the defendants’ argument “that
construing a statute of general applicability such as CUTPA to be
a predicate statute would lead to an absurd result.” 61 In Ileto v.
Glock, Inc., 62 a public nuisance case brought by private plaintiffs,
the Ninth Circuit addressed the meaning of the predicate
exception. 63 Judge Berzon stated that “the predicate exception
cannot possibly encompass every statute that might be ‘capable of
being applied’ to the sale or manufacture of firearms; if it did, the
exception would swallow the rule, and no civil lawsuits would ever
be subject to dismissal under . . . PLCAA.” 64 The Connecticut
Supreme Court dismissed the logic of Ileto v. Glock and the
defendants’ argument with the following statement: “But we are
confident that this sort of specific, narrowly framed wrongful
marketing claim alleges precisely the sort of illegal conduct that
Congress did not intend to immunize.” 65 Therefore, the court
concluded that its reading of the predicate exception would not
lead to an absurd result when defendants engage in wrongful
marketing practices. The court, relying on its view of the
legislative history, dismissed the defendants’ argument and
missed the true rationale for the PLCAA.
3. Legislative History
In its legislative history analysis, the court stated, “to the
extent that any ambiguities remain unresolved, we consider the
legislative history of PLCAA.” 66 The court concluded, “[a]lthough
the extensive history of the statute presents something of a mixed
bag . . . Congress did not intend to limit the scope of the predicate
exception to violations of firearms specific laws or to confer
60. Id. at 316 (majority opinion).
61. Id. at 311.
62. 565 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2009).
63. Id. at 1155.
64. Soto, 202 A.3d at 311 (quoting Ileto, 565 F.3d at 1155 (Berzon, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
65. Id. at 312 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 318.
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immunity from all claims alleging that firearms sellers violated
unfair trade practice laws.” 67 The court relied on the following
language in finding that Congress did not intend to shield CUTPA
statutes with the PLCAA:
This bill is only intended to protect law-abiding members of the
firearms industry from nuisance suits that have no basis in
current law, that are only intended to regulate the industry or
harass the industry or put it out of business . . . which are [not]
appropriate purposes for a lawsuit. 68

After quoting the above language, the majority interpreted the
legislative history as limiting the applicability of the PLCAA to
blameless defendants. 69 The court then concluded that CUTPA
violators do not constitute blameless defendants and should not
fall within the statutory shield of the PLCAA. 70 The court appears
to rely on the language “law-abiding” to open the door to lawsuits
for deceptive marketing. The more reasonable interpretation of the
above statement interprets “law-abiding” as a general reference to
an industry facing frivolous lawsuits. Thus, the phrase
“law-abiding” describes the firearms industry frustrated by
frivolous lawsuits and does not limit the reach of the predicate
exception.
The court’s analysis also misses compelling language in the
legislative history suggesting that Congress intended to close the
courtroom to exactly the type of case litigated in Soto. Senator
Hatch’s criticism of pending actions makes this point.
[L]awsuits, citing deceptive marketing or some other pretext,
continue to be filed in a number of [s]tates, and they continue
to be unsound. These lawsuits claim that sellers give the false
impression that gun ownership enhances personal safety or
that sellers should know that certain guns will be used illegally.
That is pure bunk. Let’s look at the truth. The fact is that none
of these lawsuits are aimed at the actual wrongdoer who kills

67. Id.
68. Id. at 318–19 (citing 151 CONG. REC. 18,104 (2005) (remarks of Senator
Max Baucus)).
69. See id. at 320.
70. See id.
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or injures another with a gun—none. Instead, the lawsuits are
focused on legitimate, law-abiding businesses. 71

This statement leaves no doubt that Congress intended to shut
down “deceptive marketing” lawsuits, such as CUTPA claims,
intended to hold the firearms industry accountable for the acts of
a “wrongdoer.”
Senator Graham also made a statement describing the overall
intent of the PLCAA.
But what this bill prevents, and I think rightfully so, is
establishing a duty along this line: That you have a
responsibility, even if you do a lawful transaction or make a safe
gun, for an event that you can’t control, which is the intentional
misuse of a weapon in a criminal fashion by another person.
That is the heart of this bill. It doesn’t relieve you of duties that
the law imposes upon you to safely manufacture and to carefully
sell. But we are not going to extend it to a concept where you
are responsible, after you have done everything right, for what
somebody else may do who bought your product and they did it
wrong and it is their fault, not yours. 72

Senator Graham’s statement focuses on the crux of the issue,
holding someone accountable for the illegal acts of another. The
court also ignored a more specific statement related to the
predicate exception that the dissent found compelling. For
example, Senator Craig explained that the “bill does not shut the
courthouse door,” in so far as
plaintiffs will have the opportunity to argue that their case falls
under the exception, such as violations of [f]ederal and [s]tate
law . . . that you have knowingly sold a firearm to a person who
cannot legally have it or who you have reason to believe could
use it for a purpose other than intended. That all comes under
the current definition of [f]ederal law. 73

The plain language used in this quotation identifies the types of
items that should fall within the predicate exception and appears
to indicate an intention to limit the exception to only those items.
71. Id. at 341 (Robinson, C.J., dissenting) (citing 151 CONG. REC. 18,073
(2005) (remarks of Senator Orrin Hatch)).
72. Id. at 342–43 (emphasis added) (citing 151 CONG. REC. 18,920 (2005)
(remarks of Senator Lindsay Graham)).
73. Id. at 340 (citing 151 CONG. REC. 18,057–58 (2005) (remarks of Senator
Larry Craig)).
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4. Conclusion
Henry Hart and Albert Sacks famously summed up the
inconsistent interpretation of statutes by remarking that “[t]he
hard truth of the matter is that American courts have no
intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of
statutory interpretation.” 74 The court’s difficulties in Soto reflect
the struggles with statutory interpretation described by Hart and
Sacks. In Soto, the court’s majority and dissent differed in the
application of the rules of statutory interpretation and the
meaning of the legislative history. As described above, the majority
seemed to begin with a belief that the PLCAA only protects
blameless defendants. The court compounded this error by
allowing it to infect its entire statutory interpretation analysis in
every step. This belief tainted its view of the predicate exception
under the plain meaning rule and ruled out an application of
ejusdem generis in the canons of construction. For the reasons
stated above, the weight of authority clearly supported the
defendants. This decision may have lit a path to the courthouse for
victims’ families and gun control activists. Part IV attempts to
predict how future plaintiffs, encouraged by the court’s ruling, may
respond in other jurisdictions.
IV. Factors Influencing Potential for Future Lawsuits in Other
States
Buoyed by the Soto decision, victims’ families and gun control
activists may look for other jurisdictions to pursue the firearms
industry. The existing state gun immunity laws and the elements
of each state’s Unfair or Deceptive Acts and Practices (UDAP) laws
could influence that choice. As a preliminary matter, plaintiffs’
UDAP claims will likely fail in states with gun immunity laws.
These states have either prohibited lawsuits by political
subdivisions or granted immunity from lawsuits in some way. 75 In
states without gun immunity laws, plaintiffs may take advantage
74. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1169 (William N. Eskridge, Jr.
& Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
75. See infra Part IV.A.
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of UDAP laws that grant attorney’s fees, authorize punitive
damages, allow the attorney general to pursue claims on behalf of
consumers, and permit class actions.
A. Gun Immunity Laws in Other States
As a preliminary matter, plaintiffs filing claims in states with
their own gun immunity laws must survive a PLCAA challenge
and a state statutory challenge before receiving a hearing on the
merits of their claims. According to the Giffords Law Center to
Prevent Gun Violence, thirty-four states currently have statutes
similar to the PLCAA or prohibit their cities or local government
entities from filing lawsuits. 76 Despite many similarities to the
PLCAA, some of the states with gun immunity statutes deviate
from the PLCAA with provisions that place additional obstacles in
the path of plaintiffs and likely constitute the least favorable
jurisdictions for lawsuits against the firearms industry. We
describe below some of the inhospitable jurisdictions and their
obstacles.
Colorado, for example, provides for an award of attorney’s fees
against plaintiffs who instigate lawsuits in violation of the
Colorado gun immunity statute. 77 In 2015, the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado awarded attorney’s fees
to Lucky Gunner, LLC upon a finding that the plaintiffs’ claims
could not overcome the statutory immunity granted gun
manufacturers in Colorado and did not meet the predicate
exception in the PLCAA. 78 Florida goes even further in its efforts
to shut down lawsuits against the firearms industry. Florida
76. See
Gun
Industry
Immunity,
GIFFORDS
L.
CTR.,
https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/other-laws-policies/gun-indu
stry-immunity/#state (last visited Sept. 2, 2019) (listing Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia as states with statutes similar to
PLCAA) (on file with the Washington & Lee Law Review).
77. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-504.5(3) (2018).
78. See Phillips v. Lucky Gunner, LLC, 84 F. Supp. 3d 1216, 1228 (D. Colo.
2015).
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grants immunity to gun manufacturers, distributors, and retailers
through a legislative finding that the manufacture, sale or
distribution of firearms “is a lawful activity and is not
unreasonably dangerous.” 79 The statute also contains a legislative
finding that the unlawful use of the firearms rather than their
manufacture, distribution or sales is the proximate cause of
injuries. 80 Unsuccessful plaintiffs, on grounds of immunity, must
reimburse the defendant for attorney’s fees, costs, compensation
for loss of income, and other expenses. 81 Georgia has closed the
courtroom to claims that gun sales constitute an unreasonably
dangerous activity or a nuisance per se, which effectively shuts
down the nuisance lawsuits facing the firearms industry and may
close the courtroom to other similar claims. 82 Wyoming has not yet
enacted an immunity statute. Instead, it has taken a different
route to end gun manufacturer lawsuits. With the governor’s
permission, Wyoming specifically empowers its attorney general to
defend the Second Amendment against gun manufacturer lawsuits
that do not involve a defective firearm. 83 As a result, gun
manufacturers have an ally in the Wyoming attorney general.
When the state has a gun immunity statute, plaintiffs must
surmount both the state statute and the PLCAA to maintain their
lawsuits. 84 The states described above, which place additional
obstacles in the path of plaintiffs, present an even more daunting
challenge. However, in states lacking a gun immunity statute,
plaintiffs need only hurdle the PLCAA to pursue lawsuits under
general applicability statutes similar to CUTPA. As a result, Soto
may have unleashed the extensive authority given attorneys
general and private individuals pursuing consumer protection law
claims in the manner described below.

79. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.331(1) (2019).
80. See id.
81. See id. § 790.331(6)(b).
82. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-173(a)(2) (2018) (declaring through a
legislative finding that gun sales do not constitute an unreasonably dangerous
activity and do not constitute a nuisance per se).
83. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-14-101 (2019).
84. See, e.g., Phillips, 84 F. Supp. 3d at 1228.
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B. Unfair and Deceptive Acts or Practices in Other States

States initially passed UDAP laws, including CUTPA, with
the intent to provide increased protection for deceptive and unfair
trade practices above the remedies previously available through
the Federal Trade Commission 85 and provide state governments
with extensive authority to ensure that businesses operate fairly
and honestly. 86 Encouraged by the result in Soto, plaintiffs may set
their sights on lawsuits in states with favorable UDAP provisions
and without gun immunity statutes. In selecting states with a
favorable climate for future litigation of this kind, the following
factors may contribute to the likelihood of emerging lawsuits.
UDAP statutes, intentionally open-ended, allow for “the
meanings of unfairness and deception . . . to be developed over
time, so that UDAP law can adapt to future business practices.” 87
These open-ended statutes give substantial powers to state
attorneys general in their interpretation and enforcement of
UDAP laws. 88 Recent exercises of these powers has led to growing
concern that the states have strayed far from the intended
purposes of the UDAP statutes. 89 Should state attorneys general
and private plaintiffs attempt to expand the meanings of “unfair”
and “deceptive” as the court did in Soto, the firearms industry
could face numerous lawsuits.
Contrary to the awarding of attorney’s fees to defendants
described above in Part IV.A, the awarding of plaintiffs’ attorney’s
fees could promote increased firearms litigation. Generally,
American courts do not award attorney’s fees to prevailing parties
in the absence of a statutory or equitable exception. 90 With respect
85. See Dee Pridgen, The Dynamic Duo of Consumer Protection: State and
Private Enforcement of Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Laws, 81 ANTITRUST
L.J. 911, 915 (2017).
86. Glenn Kaplan & Chris Barry Smith, Patching the Holes in the Consumer
Product Safety Net: Using State Unfair Practices Laws to Make Handguns and
Other Consumer Goods Safer, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 278 (2000).
87. Id. at 276.
88. Cary Silverman & Jonathan L. Wilson, State Attorney General
Enforcement of Unfair or Deceptive Acts and Practices Laws: Emerging Concerns
and Solutions, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 209, 209 (2016).
89. See id.
90. See, e.g., Samuel R. Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys’ Fees: What is
Reasonable, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 281, 281 (1977).

193
to UDAP laws, research from the National Consumer Law Center
identifies only five states that do not permit the award of attorney’s
fees in a successful UDAP claim: Arizona, Delaware, Mississippi,
South Dakota, and Wyoming. 91 Arizona, Delaware, Mississippi,
and South Dakota have gun immunity statutes and Wyoming
authorizes the attorney general’s representation of defendants in
its gun immunity legislation. As these five states already represent
inhospitable venues for litigation of this kind, the remaining states
without gun immunity statutes encourage further litigation
through the award of attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs.
In addition to the award of attorney’s fees, many states permit
multiple damages allowing consumers two or three times their
actual damages. 92 Other states permit the recovery of punitive
damages where the businesses acted intentionally. 93 These states
may encourage additional UDAP lawsuits against gun
manufacturers, distributors, and retailers.
When private plaintiffs receive the assistance of state
attorneys general in firearms litigation, they gain a powerful ally
and the firearms industry has a formidable adversary. State
attorneys general, under a parens patriae theory, often seek
recovery on behalf of an entire class of consumers 94 and their
authority may include powerful investigative tools such as civil
investigative demands (CIDs). 95 These CIDs allow attorneys
general to demand information early in the investigative process. 96
When not preempted by other laws, such as gun immunity
statutes, UDAP laws generally permit state attorneys general or
other consumer protection officers to seek a wide range of remedies

91. NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., Consumer Protection in the States: A 50-State
Evaluation of Unfair and Deceptive Practices Laws 2 (2018),
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/udap-report.pdf.
92. See id. at 43.
93. See id.
94. See Edward D. Burbach, 2018 Consumer Protection Priorities of State
Attorneys
General,
FOLEY
&
LARDNER
LLP
(July
6,
2018),
https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2018/07/2018-consumerprotection-priorities-of-state-attor (last visited Sept. 2, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
95. See id.
96. See id.
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including injunctive relief, restitution, and civil penalties. 97
According to the National Consumer Law Center, every state but
Rhode Island allows the State to ask a court to impose a monetary
penalty on a business that has engaged in an unfair or deceptive
practice. 98 Among the other forty-nine states and the District of
Columbia, the amounts of the penalties vary widely. 99 For
example, Maryland imposes a civil penalty of not more than
$10,000 per initial violation 100 and $25,000 for each subsequent
violation. 101 In contrast, Iowa can impose a penalty up to $40,000
per violation. 102
Class actions allow plaintiffs to litigate a claim on behalf of
both themselves—that is, the named plaintiffs—and class
members who do not join as plaintiffs. 103 Class actions facilitate
the sharing of litigation costs among the named plaintiffs and
other class members. 104 This cost sharing creates claims where
claims may not have arisen in the absence of the availability of a
class action. With respect to UDAP, most states permit class
actions. 105 However, the UDAP statutes of eight states deny class
actions: Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Louisiana,
Montana, South Carolina, and Tennessee. 106 Since all eight states
also have gun immunity statutes, class actions remain available in
states that already have a favorable climate for successful
lawsuits. 107
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Silverman & Wilson, supra note 88, at 214.
NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 91, at 30.
See id. at 5–8.
See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-410(a) (2019).
See id. § 13-410(b).
See IOWA CODE § 714.16(7) (2019).
See ROBERT M. LANGER ET AL., CONN. PRAC. SERIES, UNFAIR TRADE
PRACTICES § 8.4 (2018) (stating that “[t]he class action is a procedural mechanism
enabling representative parties to litigate on behalf of a class of unnamed persons
who are not joined in the action”).
104. See WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:87 (5th ed.
2013) (stating that class actions “enable the litigation of claims that would
otherwise be infeasible to litigate because the value of the claim is dwarfed by the
costs of adjudicating it”).
105. See NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 91, at 36.
106. See id.
107. See supra note 76 (listing the states with gun immunity laws).
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V. Conclusion
News reports depict our country as a nation gripped in an
unending loop of gun violence, senseless school shootings, and
inexplicable congressional silence. For example, one news outlet
reports that for the one-year period ending in February of 2019,
our nation experienced a school shooting, on average, every 11.8
days. 108 Admittedly, the explanations for this alarming statistic
are complex. To begin to address these concerns, some call for
increased restrictions on the right to purchase certain types of
weapons while others see any proposed restrictions as an
infringement of Second Amendment rights. When we seek to
diminish gun ownership rights, “[w]e look first to Congress, then
to the State Legislatures as the arbiters of such matters, subject to
the oversight of the courts.” 109 In the absence of congressional
action, plaintiffs understandably seek other avenues to redress the
harm caused by acts of gun violence.
The tragic events that occurred in the morning hours at the
Sandy Hook Elementary School unfolded as they did, in part, due
to the sheer firepower of the weapon used by the perpetrator. Our
society permits the lawful ownership of these powerful weapons,
but wrestles with the assignment of fault when third parties use
the weapons in a heinous criminal act. Such was the crux of the
issue in Soto. Plaintiffs sought relief under CUTPA for the
defendants’ alleged “unethical, oppressive, immoral, and
unscrupulous” marketing of a lawful firearm. 110 The primary
stumbling block for plaintiffs, such as those in Soto, is the fact that
in passing the PLCAA, Congress has seemingly prevented the
ability of those in the firearms industry to be sued for harms that
result from a third party’s wrongful use of a lawfully owned
weapon.
108. See Brandon Griggs & Christina Walker, In the Year Since Parkland
There’s Been a School Shooting, on Average, Every 12 Days, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/14/us/school-shootings-since-parklandtrnd/index.html (last updated Feb. 14, 2019) (last visited Sept. 2, 2019) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
109. Mystica M. Alexander & Scott R. Thomas, Rogue Retailers or Agents of
Necessary Change? Using Corporate Policy as a Tool to Reshape Gun Ownership,
166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 283, 295 (2018).
110. Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int’l, LLC, 202 A.3d 262, 277 (Conn. 2019).
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In deciding that the PLCAA did not bar the plaintiffs’ CUTPA
claims, the majority of the Connecticut Supreme Court stepped
into policymaking that contradicted the congressional intent in
passing the PLCAA. The Soto dissent correctly understood the
proper role of the courts in these matters and the restraint needed
to play that role. The dissent believed that Congress had made its
intent very clear. Congress intended to “absolve defendants like
these . . . from liability for criminal use of firearms by third parties
except in the most limited and narrow circumstances . . . .” 111 The
dissenting opinion, authored by Chief Justice Robinson, went
further and admonished the majority by stating that the court
should act merely as “surrogates for another policy maker” and
should not, “under the guise of statutory interpretation,” legislate
a particular policy. 112 Unfortunately, the majority played the role
of legislator or regulator of the firearms industry, supplanting its
own policy for the policy set out by Congress.
The Connecticut Superior Court has not yet heard plaintiffs’
argument on the merits and we are waiting to see whether the U.S.
Supreme Court will grant the defendant’s petition for certiorari
filed with the Court on August 1, 2019. Despite this uncertainty,
Soto could prompt additional filings and further policymaking by
the courts resulting from the favorable UDAP platform built for
plaintiffs in several states. The open-ended UDAP laws, the
powerful tools given state attorneys general, and the potential for
attorney’s fees and enhanced damage awards increase the
likelihood of further UDAP enforcement actions against gun
manufacturers, distributors, and retailers in states without gun
immunity statutes. Although the lack of solutions for gun violence
may frustrate gun control activists and victims’ families,
overturning bipartisan legislation 113 and “suing guns out of
existence” does not properly reflect our democratic principles.
111. Id. at 346 (Robinson, C.J., dissenting).
112. Id.
113. See David Kopel, The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act: Facts
POST
(May
24,
2016),
and
Policy,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/05/24/theprotection-of-lawful-commerce-in-arms-act-facts-and-policy/ (last visited Sept. 2,
2019) (stating the PLCAA passed in the U.S. House of Representatives by a
bipartisan vote of 283 to 144 in October 2005 after it passed the Senate in July by
a vote of 65 to 31) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

